Wal-Mart, Toys " R" Us, and other large retail chains are often identified with cheap imports. We use data from the Census of Retail Trade and the International Trade Commission over the period 1997-2002 to test whether big chains serve as platforms for imports from LDCs. Using difference-in-difference specifications we show that Chinese and other LDC imports have increased disproportionately in retail sectors with the sharpest consolidation into chains. To quantify the importance of chain growth to import growth we apply a numerical algorithm that generates marginal propensities to import by firm size. The largest retail firms' propensity to import from China is 17 percentage points higher than that of smaller retailers; the corresponding difference in import propensities from LDCs as a whole is 27 points. The disproportionate growth of large retailers between 1997 and 2002 explains 5% of the overall growth in consumer goods imports, 20% of the growth in consumer goods imports from China, and 22% of the growth in consumer goods imports from LDCs.
Introduction
A growing body of anecdotal evidence suggests that larger retailers sell a disproportionate share of imported goods. For example, Wal-Mart handles 6.5% of U.S. retail sales but accounts for over 15% of U.S. imports of consumer goods from China . Toys " R" Us, the second-largest toy seller in the United States (after Wal-Mart) received extra scrutiny in the wake of a recent lead-paint scare (see, for example, Schwartz, 2007) . This is significant because the retail sector is increasingly dominated by large retail chains; Figure 1 shows the increasing share of retail dollars spent at chains, and especially large chains (with over 100 stores) over the past several decades. The average sales share of the top four firms in each sector, also shown, has followed a similarly-increasing trend.
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The trend shows no sign of abating; between 1997 and 2002, sales at chains as a percentage of total sales increased by 3 percentage points; sales at large chains as a share of total sales increased by 6 percentage points; and the average share of the top four firms in a retail sector increased by 4.5 percentage points. While total (nominal) retail sales increased by approximately 20%, sales at the four largest firms in each sector increased by 35% on average.
These observations raise the question whether disproportionate growth of the largest retail firms, combined with their greater propensity to import, has significantly contributed to the rise in imports of consumer goods from LDCs. Between 1997 and 2002 in particular, imports of consumer goods from China increased by 64%; imports from Mexico increased by 43%; and imports from Central America increased by 34%. Figure 2 shows the share of consumer goods imports accounted for by rich countries, non-rich non-oil countries, and China from 1989 to 2007.
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In this paper, we use data from the Census of Retail Trade and the International Trade Commission to test for a relationship between consolidation in the retail sector and the rise in imports of consumer goods from China and other LDCs. We find that sectors whose large firms grew fastest also increased their imports the most. A difference-in-difference specification shows that Chinese and other LDC imports have increased disproportionately in retail sectors with the sharpest consolidation into chains. To quantify the importance of chain growth to import growth we apply a numerical algorithm that generates marginal propensities to import by firm size. Our results imply that between 1997 and 2002 the marginal propensity to import from China was 17 percentage points higher than that of smaller retailers; the corresponding difference in import propensities from LDCs as a whole is 27 points. The disproportionate growth of large retailers between 1997 and 2002 explains 5% of the overall growth in consumer goods imports, 20% of the growth in consumer goods imports from China, and 22% of the growth in consumer goods imports from LDCs.
A positive correlation between retailer (chain) size and imports is natural in the presence of economies of scale in retailing and economies of scale in importing. model these economies of scale in importing from LDCs as arising from fixed costs in contracting with suppliers across big geographical, institutional, and cultural differences. A retailer with relatively low sales volume will not find it profitable to incur such a cost and will prefer to purchase wares from domestic suppliers. In contrast, bigger retailers, selling higher volumes, can spread the fixed cost over many units. Cheaper imports prompt these retail chains to grow, again increasing imports. Because of economies of scale in retail, the expansion of the retail chain also lowers unit cost, reinforcing the positive relationship between retailer chain size and imports. A similar intuition is captured in Raff and Schmitt's (2008) general-equilibrium model exploring the relationship between trade costs and the size distribution of retailers.
In the absence of firm-or store-level data on the origin of goods sold, we use aggregate data on 72 retail sectors, such as florists, books stores, and drug stores, over a five year period from 1997 to 2002 to test whether sectors with the fastest growth in the size of the 2 largest retailers are also the sectors with the fastest growth in sales of imported goods. We use a difference-in-difference specification to account for time-invariant differences between sectors. We assign imports of each of 42 product categories to sectors based on the sector's share of sales of each product. Our data on the size of retail firms, sector-level sales, and the distribution of product sales across sectors come from the Census of Retail Trade (CRT) for 1997 and 2002. Data on import values by product for each country of origin come from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Using several specifications (weighted, unweighted, and log-log) we show that sectors whose top-four firms grew disproportionately between 1997 and 2002 were more likely to specialize in selling shares of products whose imports from China and other LDCs increased disproportionate over the same period. The opposite relationship holds for imports from rich countries: sectors whose top-four firms grew disproportionately were likely to decrease their imports from rich countries. We supplement these regressions with earlier data, where similar, but weaker, results hold.
These difference-in-difference estimates do not fully capture the relationship between a chain's size and its level of imports because the measure of imports we use is based only on sales. In the second part of the paper we introduce a numerical algorithm that allows us to overcome this problem and compute marginal propensities to import (MPIs) by firm size. The algorithm produces internally-consistent estimates in the sense that the computed MPIs are also used to allocate imports across sectors. We use a delete-one jackknife plan to correct for bias in the MPIs and compute standard errors. This exercise generates plausible numbers for the MPIs of different size firms from various source countries and regions. Large firms' MPI from China, for example, is about 14%, while their propensity to import from LDCs as a whole is 23%.
The combination of large chains' higher propensities to import from LDCs and their higher growth rates explains a substantial share of increased imports of consumer goods from LDCs. Without these effects, import growth from China between 1997 and 2002 would have been 20% lower and import growth from LDCs as a whole would have been 22% lower.
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Mexican and Central American imports would have been about 10% lower over this period had retail firms grown uniformly within each sector. Worldwide imports, however, would have been only 5% lower due to the fact that imports growth from rich countries was slower than it would have been had small and large firms grown at equal rates.
Our paper is related to findings by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (forthcoming) , who use Customs records to show that importing firms across all sectors in the economy (including retail) tend to be large. Because not all imports of consumer goods are done by retailers -a significant portion is handled by wholesalers, merchandisers, import firms, and other intermediaries -the fact that large retail firms are more likely to engage in direct imports does not, by itself, demonstrate a link between a retailer's size and the origin of the products it sells. We are able to answer the latter question by focusing on the products sold by retailers rather than on the identity of the importer.
More generally, despite the abundance of popular discussion surrounding the retail industry and international trade patterns, there is a dearth of empirical work relating these topics. Two recent innovative papers have explored different dimensions of this relationship. Campbell and Lapham (2004) use county-level data to show a relationship between U.S.-Canada exchange rate movements and the number of retailers operating in border counties. Evans and Harrigan (2005) find that the characteristics of the retailer can influence the pattern of international trade. Using proprietary data from a major chain of department stores, they establish that the retailer's demand for just-in-time deliveries influences its choice of source countries.
To focus on the relationship between retailer size and the structure of imports, we abstract from other effects of consolidation in the retail sector. One effect due to increased bargaining power of a large retailer may be to increase production efficiency by suppliers; Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout (2006) argue for such an effect of Walmex on Mexican soap producers. A similar effect may occur via "backwards-integration' of the retailer with its suppliers (Betancourt, 2004) . Buyer power can also have ramifications for the distribution 4 of rents between retailers and manufacturers when trade is liberalized (Raff and Schmitt, 2007) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the data in Section 2 and our reduced-form empirical specification and results in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce a numerical algorithm to compute marginal propensities to import (MPIs) by firm size. The counterfactual exercise is described in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of possible interpretations of our results and their implications.
Data Construction
Our unit of analysis is a 6-digit retail sector, such as tire dealers (441320) There is no readily-available measure of imports by retail sector. Instead, we use a weighted sum of imports by product, using as weights the importance of each sector in selling the product. Import figures by product are available at a very disaggregated level (HTS10) and we aggregate imports to broad categories to match them with retail sales data.
Our import variable therefore is not equal to actual imports at the sector level, but is the level of imports a sector would have if it sold exactly the same proportion of imports as all other sectors selling the same good. Product-level import data come from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 3 In Section 4 we compute sector-level imports that are consistent with our estimation results.
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Trade DataWeb for each of 6,564 products by 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes, and allocated each HTS code to a product code.
4 Each year's imports of product p, m p , is calculated as
where m h is the import value of HTS10 h. Let M p denote the P × 1 vector of product import, where P is the total number of products in our data; values m p are the elements of
The Census of Retail Trade, conducted every five years in years ending in "2"and "7," includes dollar sales, by sector, for each of 38 broad product categories ( To impute sector-level imports, we assign product imports to sectors based on the value of sales of the product accounted for by each sector. Call S the total number of sectors and denote by L the S × P matrix of product-sector sales in a given year. An element l sp of L is the dollar sales of product p through sector s. Total sales of product p in a given year, l p , is the sum of the elements of column vector p. Let N c (·) be a column normalization operator that converts elements of the argument matrix to shares within a column by dividing by the sum of elements within the column. That is, N c (L) is an S × P matrix whose elements are lsp lp , or the share of the imports of product p sold through sector s. For each year of data, we compute the S × 1 vector of sector imports as
In other words, we assign imports of each product to each sector in proportion to the sector's sales share for that product; total import sales by sector s, m s , is computed as the sum of product imports accounted for by the sector.
The data construction process is presented graphically in Figure 3 . Ninety six products, Although a mapping from SIC to NAICS does exist, it is extremely noisy. In addition to the fact than many NAICS codes are created from parts of 4-digit SIC codes, and the data on the size of the top firms and product sales are at the 3-digit level, eleven of the 72 retail NAICS codes are mapped, in whole or in part, to wholesale rather than retail SIC codes.
Since the Census of Wholesale Trade (CWT) uses a different product classification scheme than the Census of Retail Trade (CRT) the mapping between product codes is not 1-to-1, so several additional layers of noise would be introduced with this mapping. We opted instead to use a short panel of SIC data -one observation from the late 1980s, the second from 1992 -to test whether the above relationship holds in the earlier data as well.
The period 1987-1992 is of interest in our context. The period roughly coincides with Wal-Mart's famous "Buy American" campaign, launched in 1985 with pledges to "buy American whenever we can" and to pay up to a 5% premium for U.S.-made goods (Zellner, 1992) .
The campaign collapsed in late 1992 amid allegations by Dateline NBC that Wal-Mart was producing private-label clothes in Bangladesh, smuggling Chinese garments into the U.S. in excess of U.S. quotas, and placing imported clothes on racks marked "Made in the USA" (Gladstone, 1992) . However, China was not the main concern of American protectionists during this period. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified in 1992 amid much controversy and ultimately substantially increased U.S. imports from Mexico (Romalis, 2004) . Responding to concerns about NAFTA, Ross Perot coined the phrase "giant sucking sound," referring to anticipated displacement of American jobs with Mexican jobs, during his 1992 Presidential bid.
Though the results are illuminating, we treat the historical data as secondary to the NAICS data for several reasons. First, the Economic Census for the late 1980s refers to 1987 8 but the earliest import data we could obtain from USITC were for 1989, so the match is imperfect. Second, at the 3-digit SIC level (for which we have Census data) there are only 41 sectors compared with the 72 6-digit NAICS codes available to us in the later data; three of these sectors have missing data so we are only able to use 38 in the analysis. 7 Third, the mapping between products and sectors was less precise in the earlier period and required some imputation. We used as much as possible of the information available (total sales per sector, total sales per product, and information about sales in any specific product-sector combination or product-set of sectors combination) to impute the missing observations before aggregating the data to the final form. Given these data limitations, in particular the smaller number of observations and the mismatch between the years for which imports and sales are measured, we expect lower precision as well as attenuation bias in our coefficient estimates.
Despite these reservations, the historical data provide a check on our results and also a secondary test of the theory. Given the concern about trade with Mexico and Central America over this period, and given the smaller overall size of chains, we expect to find more action in these regions than in China and Asia in the earlier period. 
Estimation and Results
Combining the data on imports, sector sales, and the sales in the largest four firms, we test whether sectors whose largest firms grew disproportionately between 1997 and 2002
were more likely to sell products whose imports increased the most during this period. We estimate the following difference-in-difference equation:
where Top4Sales st is the sales amount in dollars by the largest four firms in sector s in year t; Non4Sales st is the sales amount in dollars by all other firms in sector s in year t; α s is a sector fixed effect, δ t is a year fixed effect, and Imports st is the dollar value of imports attributed to sector s. We estimate this regression for the years 1997 and 2002, with sectors identified by 6-digit NAICS codes.
By including sector fixed effects in the regression we allow for the fact that sectors with larger dominant firms may import more (or less) than other sectors for reasons not related to our story. We also include a 2002 year dummy to capture the fact that both sales at the largest firms and imports have increased over time. (The year dummy also captures any changes in price level across time periods.) Our focus is on the coefficients β and γ. If β > γ, then sectors that sell products whose import share has grown faster are the same sectors whose top-four firms have grown faster over this period.
Including both Top4Sales and Non4Sales in the regression is equivalent to including only one of them and controlling for total sector sales. We prefer this specification, however, because in the next section we use this functional form to estimate the marginal propensity to import (MPI) by firm type.
Because sectors vary dramatically in size -the largest sector, new car dealers (NAICS 441110) has sales 5,000-10,000 times as large as the smallest sector, other fuel dealers (NAICS 454319) -a concern in the OLS regression is that large sectors, with large errors, are over-weighted relative to smaller sectors. Although we use robust standard errors (with ε st clustered by sector) we explicitly correct for heteroskedasticity due to differences in sector size using weighted least-squares (WLS). In the WLS specification each observation is weighted by 1 SectorSales 2 st , the inverse of squared sector sales. This weighting is equivalent to dividing each observation by SectorSales st . Table 2 reports WLS estimates for each of the seven countries and sets of countries listed in Table 1 along with χ 2 statistics from Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity related to sector size. We cannot reject the null of homoskedasticity for any region. For completeness, we report unweighted regression results in Table 3 ; there, we easily reject the null of homoskedasticity.
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For China, our point estimate of β is 0.0974, as compared with 0.0295 for γ; we can reject the hypothesis that β ≤ γ at the 95% confidence level. 12 Interpreting these point estimates, we find that for every dollar increase in top-four sales in a given sector, the value of Chinese imports of products sold by that sector increase by 9.74 cents; for every dollar increase in sales of smaller firms, the value of Chinese imports of products increase by only 2.95 cents. In other words, sectors selling products that are increasingly imported from
China are more likely to be those with a high growth among the top-four retailers; sectors with a high growth among smaller retailers tend to sell products whose import rates have increased more slowly. The differences between our estimates of β and γ are positive for all other regions, except rich countries; and statistically significant at the 95% level for Mexico and non-rich non-oil countries (and at 90% for Central America).
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The effect is reversed for rich countries (second-to-last column). There we estimate β = 0.0294, as compared with γ = 0.093. This result is in line with model; the costs of sourcing products from rich countries are similar to the costs of sourcing domestically, so we expect such sourcing to be more prevalent among small retailers than large ones. In this case we test the null hypothesis that β ≥ γ, which we reject at the 90% confidence level. In fact, it is a rich country -Japan -that limits our ability to reject the null that β ≤ γ for Asia. If we omit Japanese imports when we calculate Asian imports the results (not shown) for Asia are starker: β increases to 0.135, γ falls to 0.052, and the null is rejected at the 95% confidence level.
World-wide imports follow a pattern between that of non-rich and rich countries. As an alternative for dealing with heteroskedasticity, we also estimate a log-log specification:
Results from the log specification are reported in the top panel of Table 4 . Now, the coefficients β and γ can be interpreted as (reduced-form) elasticities. Because the sales size of the top four firms may be smaller or larger than the sales size of the rest of the firms in the retail sector, the slope implied by these estimates varies by sector. On average over this period the top four firms account for 30% of sales in each sector, but their share of sector sales varies from under 10% to about 90%, depending on the sector. The lower panels of Table   4 use, respectively, the mean and median values of Imports, Top4, and Non4 to evaluate and compare these two slopes. As in the previous specifications, for most low-cost source countries we find a stronger relationship between the growth of imports of products sold in a sector and growth in the top four firms in that sector than we do between import growth and the growth of smaller firms. Again, the relationship is reversed for rich (high-cost) source countries. We can reject equality of the two slopes for China, Central America, and the sum 13 of non-rich non-oil countries at the 5% level using both mean and median values.
We also report results from regressions using data from 1987 and 1992 in Tables 5-7 .
These results are consistent with our hypotheses. The point estimates are generally smaller, as are the differences between the two coefficients, consistent with attenuation bias due to the imperfect match of ITC and Census data for the 1980s. In Table 5 , which reports our preferred WLS specification, the difference between the coefficients is significant for China, Central America, and Non-Rich Non-Oil countries at the 90% confidence level. Confidence levels are overall higher in the unweighted regressions reported in Table 6 , and generally lower in the log regressions reported in Table 7 . Note, however, that the historical estimates cannot be compared directly to the current estimates since the identity and size of the largest firms depends on sector definitions, which changed between 1992 and 1997.
Overall, we find that there is a positive relationship between the (disproportionate) growth of the top retailers in a sector and growth in imports of products that are sold in that sector from less-developed countries. This result implies that not only do large retailers engage in more direct imports from LDCs (arrangements that require direct engagement with suppliers), but that smaller retailers do not make up the difference by simply buying more imported goods from intermediaries.
Numerical Results
The results in the previous section show a relationship between firm size and tendency to sell products more heavily imported from LDCs. In this section we go one step further and estimate firms' marginal propensity to import (MPI) by size. Conceptually, the difference between what we do here and in the previous section is that we now take into account the fact that two sectors with similar overall sizes and similar sales patterns (i.e., selling the same products at roughly the same rates) have different import shares if their levels of concentration (top-four sales as a fraction of total sales) are different. We use the term MPI to refer to a reduced-form, rather than structural, relationship between import levels and firm size. Methodologically, this exercise requires determining sector imports and estimating the regression equation simultaneously, which we do using a numerical algorithm.
Because the method is computational, we cannot rely on asymptotic or even Huber-White standard errors to assess the statistical significance of the results; we use delete-one jackknife resampling to obtain standard errors and correct the point estimates for bias.
If firms of different sizes have different import propensities then sectors with similar overall sales figures but different size distributions of firms must import at different rates. In other words, by assuming, as we did in the previous section, that imports of a product are distributed across sectors in proportion to the sales of that product, and constructing sector imports without regard to the size distribution of firms in the sector, we implicitly disregarded our hypothesis. The fact that we obtained economically and statistically different estimates of coefficient estimates on sales of large and small firms (β and γ, respectively) confirms our hypothesis. But this method under-assigned import values to sectors with larger firms than implied by our estimates. As a result, β understates large-firms' MPI and γ overstates small-firms' MPI.
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In general, sector imports in a given year are derived from product imports by way of a transformation that we write in matrix form as
where the transformation matrix W is a function of L, and of the variables Top4Sales and Non4Sales in each sector as well as the two marginal propensities to import, β and γ. It is the latter element that is missing in the way we constructed the transformation matrix in Equation (1). To account for this missing piece, define θ s as the sales share of the top four firms in sector s; the share of the non-top-four firms is thus (1 − θ s ). Define θ as an S × 2 matrix where a row s is a vector [θ s 1 − θ s ]. Define also the vector of MPIs as
We postulate the form of the transformation matrix as:
The product θB is an S × 1 vector with elements θ s β + (1 − θ s )γ, the average propensity to import of sector s. D(θB) is an S × S matrix whose diagonal is the vector θB and the off-diagonal elements are zero. The product D(θB)L is a matrix of product-sector imports implied by the MPI vector B. Elements of N c (D(θB)L) are the share of product p imports going to sector s.
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We can now see that the weighting matrix we used in Section 2 was a special case of this weighting matrix. If B T = [β β], then D(θB) = βI S×S where I S×S is an S × S identity matrix. Plugging this into Equation (5) 
The transformation matrix is also the matrix of sales shares of a product across sectors.
Conceptually, we want to find a vector B * such that the vector of sector imports constructed from B * will result in an estimate of the MPIs equal to B * . Operationally, we guess a value B j . Using equations (4) and (5) 
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The top panel of Table 8 show results from this computation applied to our preferred 16 Recall that N c (·) is a column normalization operator that converts elements of the argument matrix to shares within a column by dividing by the sum of elements within the column. 17 We limit our search to a subset of R 2 . Our methodology does not preclude the possibility of solution outside the search space. We disregard the trivial solution B T = [0 0] as well as any solution that assigns a negative value to any sector's imports.
(WLS) specification. 18 We use a delete-one jackknife plan to correct for bias and compute standard errors. 19 We use jackknife rather than bootstrap resampling because the latter method is much more computationally intensive. As a check, we did calculate bootstrap estimates for China which turned out to be very similar to the jackknife results. Overall, we find that the difference between the top-four firms' and smaller firms' MPIs is larger in absolute value than the difference between the coefficients reported in Table 2 . This finding is consistent with our observation that the initial data construction under-allocated imports to more-concentrated sectors and over-allocated them to less-concentrated sectors.
Focusing on China, we find that the marginal propensity to import by the top-four firms was 14%, whereas the MPI for the rest of the sector was -2.9%. The top-four MPI of 14% means that, ceteris paribus, an increase of one dollar in sales at the top-four firms is accompanied by a 14 cent increase in that sector's imports from China. The most striking numbers are for the rich and non-rich, non-oil regions. The top-four firms' MPI from non-rich, non-oil countries is 23% where as the smaller firms' MPI from these countries is −4%. In contrast, the MPI from rich countries is negative (−1.6%) for the 18 We use only the recent NAICS-based data (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) in this exercise because of the historical data's shortcomings discussed in Section 2, in particular the small number of observations and the mismatch between the 1989 import data and the 1987 sales figures.
19 In practice, we omit one sector at a time. For each jackknife sample we search for the vector B * that satisfies the above condition.
20 Both point estimates for β and γ were similar, but marginally smaller in absolute value, with bootstrapping; as were the standard errors. Equality of the coefficients is resoundingly rejected. largest firms and positive (13%) for smaller firms.
While larger in absolute value, the computed MPIs are not dramatically different from the difference-in-difference estimates reported in Table 2 . But the interpretation of these figures is different. While the difference-in-difference estimates capture the relationship between consolidation (differential growth) in a retail sector and growth of imports of the sort of products that the sector tends to sell, the computational results quantify the relationship between consolidation in a sector and imports that the sector actually sells.
While these estimates correct for the allocations of imports across sectors, there is one factor they omit. The left-hand side variables, imports, is measured in input dollars, whereas the right-hand side variable, retail revenues, is measured in output dollars. To compare these figures we need to know the size of the retail markup over the import price, or equivalently the elasticities of residual demand curves facing individual stores. If store-specific elasticities of demand range from approximately 2 (for DVDs, estimated by Chiou, forthcoming) to 3 (estimate for aggregate demand elasticity at Wal-Mart from , then the difference of 17 cents between large and small firms' MPIs translates to a difference as large as 25-34 cents between the share of the marginal dollar spent at a top-four retailer and the share spent at a smaller retailer that goes to Chinese-produced goods. A similar calculation shows that the difference between the share of the marginal dollar spent at large and small retailers that purchases goods from LDCs as a whole ranges between 40 and 54 cents.
Counterfactual Exercise
To understand the effect of the relationship between import growth and retail-chain consolidation, we use the MPI estimates in Table 8 to calculate what import growth from the various source countries and regions would have been had the consolidation trend, depicted in Figure 1 , stopped in 1997. Specifically, we perform the following thought experiment.
Holding fixed (at actual levels) the total increase in sales in each sector, we ask how much imports would have increased if this sector-level growth had been uniform, that is, if sales at the top-four firms had increased at the same rate as sales in the smaller firms. 
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The impact of the disproportionate growth of larger retailers on import growth between 1997 and 2002 is summarized in the lower panel in Table 8 . For each source country or region we calculate the import growth rate, starting from 1997 levels, under the actual and counterfactual scenarios. We do this by aggregating the implied import increases, sector by sector, that are implied by the MPI estimates. For example, import growth from China under the actual change in the size distribution of retailers is estimated at 71% over this period. Had the size distribution of firms remained constant, however, import growth from China would have been lower by 20 points. There is approximately a 10-point difference in the growth of Asian, Mexican, and Central American imports, and a 22-point difference in the overall growth of imports from LDCs.
The main impact of the size distribution of firms is not on the total volume of imports, however, but on the distribution of imports: which source countries are used the most. The growth in world imports is estimated to be similar under the two scenarios: the difference is only 5%. Growth of imports from rich countries would have been sharply curtailed had small firms and large firms grown at the same rate over this period, partially offsetting the growth of LDC imports. These results underscore the point that both small and large retailers sell imported products -but they obtain them from different places.
Concluding Remarks
We use data from the Census of Retail Trade and the U.S. International Trade Commission to test for a relationship between the size of the largest retail firms in each sector and the value of imports the sector sells. Using a difference-in-difference specification to control for both time-invariant differences across sectors and overall growth of imports, we find disproportionate increases in imports from China and other less-developed countries (LDCs) for goods sold in sectors that are increasingly dominated by large chains. We estimate the difference between large and small firms' marginal propensity to import from China -the share of an additional dollar in sales that is used to buy goods from China -at nearly 17 cents per dollar, and over 27 cents per dollar for LDCs as a whole. In contrast, small firms spend nearly 15 cents more per dollar than large firms on imports from rich source countries.
Since these figures do not adjust for a retail markup, the true differences in MPIs may be up to twice as large. Our results highlight the relationship between growing retailer size and the growth in imports from cheaper source countries. The growth of the largest retailers has raised increasing concerns of market power in both input and output markets (see, for example Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006; Petrovic and Hamilton, 2006; Spector, 2005) . The sharpest takeover by large retailers has occurred in the general-merchandise retail sector in which stores stock a variety of goods, from housewares to apparel to electronics. These large retailers have not only added more stores but also increased the number of products they offer for sale, capitalizing on consumers' demand for "one-stop shopping" (Basker, Klimek, and Van, 2008) . Cheaper imports may induce these retailers to expand at an even faster rate, with far-reaching competitive effects.
The growth in imports from LDCs has consequences beyond the retail sector. Developing countries' manufacturing sectors are becoming more efficient due to competitive pressures and learning by doing (see Dollar, 2008 , for a discussion of the reforms that have enhanced China's competitiveness); at the same time, increased competition among LDCs may have wider distributional implications. One question related to our study, but which cannot be directly addressed with our data, is the degree to which China's rise has held back exports of other countries. Hanson and Robertson (2008) and Moreira (2007) provide contrasting views on this question.
The increase in imports from developing countries has also contributed to low and falling prices for many consumer goods. Consumer prices have fallen dramatically in some of the sectors with the highest increase in imports from China between 1997 and 2002. At a time when the overall CPI rose by 14%, the CPI for computer hardware and software fell by 80% and 30% respectively, by 40% for televisions, and by more than 20% for toys. These falling prices have disproportionately benefited poorer Americans (Broda and Romalis, 2008) .
Large chains have contributed to falling prices by facilitating substitution between high-21 cost imports and low-cost imports. All retailers sell imported products, but only the largest retailers have the resources necessary to pay the fixed costs associated with contracting directly with low-cost countries and are able to reap the benefit of substantially lower production costs. The consolidation in the retail sector has had only a small effect on the overall quantity of imports, but it has dramatically changed the composition of source countries for these imports. 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 All Each regression has 144 observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Each column represents a separate regression. Each regression has 144 observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Each column represents a separate regression. Each regression has 76 observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% a t statistic is for a test of H 0 : β ≤ γ except for Rich, where H 0 : β ≥ γ. (β is the coefficient on Top4Sales
and γ is the coefficient on Non4Sales.) 
